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I. INTRODUCTION
For the past twenty-six years, the federal district courts have
consistently used Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act1 to protect
American citizens employed abroad by United States companies
from discrimination in the workplace. 2 However, in March 1991,
the United States Supreme Court rejected this line of cases in
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American
Oil Co.,3 holding that Title VII does not apply extraterritorially to
U.S. firms employing Americans abroad.4 This ruling denies a
cause of action in U.S. courts under Title VII for employment
discrimination, which occurs outside the U.S., based on race, color,
religion, gender, or national origin.5 The decision will potentially
affect many of the estimated 2.2 million American citizens
currently residing abroad and the more than two thousand U.S.
companies operating in excess of twenty-one thousand foreign
subsidiaries in at least 121 foreign nations.6
This note examines the decision in EEOC v. Arabian American
Oil Co. Part II gives an account of the provisions of Title VII, the
positions the EEOC and the Department of Justice have taken with
regard to its extraterritorial application, and the cases the Supreme
Court cited to support its opposite holding. Part III discusses the
Court's reasoning in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,7 while
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17 (1988).
2. For cases applying Title VII abroad, see Seville v. Martin Marietta Corp., 638 F. Supp.
590,596 (D. Md. 1986); Lavrov v. NCR Corp., 591 F. Supp. 102, 112 (S.D. Ohio 1984); and Bryant
v. Int'l Sch. Services, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472,492 (D. NJ. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 675 F.2d
562, 577 (3d Cir. 1982).
3. 111 S. CL 1227, 1236 (1991).
4. Id. at 1236.
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
6. Stephen Wermiel, Supreme Court Rules Civil Rights Act Doesn't Bar Bias by U.S. Firms
Abroad, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 1991, at A16.
7. See generally Conly J. Schulte, Casenote, Americans Employed Abroad by United States
Firms are Denied Protection Under Title VII EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 25 CREIGHTON
L Rav. 351 (1991) (criticizing the Supreme Court's statutory analysis and stressing that the
dissenting opinion properly states the appropriate approach); Edwin F. Choeiey, Jr., Note, itle V1I
Does Not Apply to American Citizens Employed by United States Corporations in Foreign Countries
Because Congress Failed to Express a Clear Transnational Intent-EEOC v. Arabian American Oil
Co., 22 SEToN HALL L REV. 91 (1991) (arguing that the majority misinterpreted precedent to arrive
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Part IV deals with the ramifications of this ruling on U.S. citizens
and companies, and addresses the possible impact the Court's
reasoning will have on other federal and state legislation. In
addition, Part IV focuses on House Bill 1694 and the recently
enacted Civil Rights Act of 1991,' which once again extends Title
VII protections to American citizens working abroad for American
companies, in effect overturning EEOC v. Arabian American Oil
Co. [hereinafter Aramco].'0
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
Title VII provides, in part, that discrimination in employment
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin violates the
Civil Rights Act of 1964." Discrimination on these bases by an
employer with respect to an employee's compensation, terms,
opportunities, or privileges of employment is unlawful."
Additionally, an employer may not discharge or refuse to hire
individuals based on their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. 3 An employee; as defined by Title VII, is any individual
employed by an employer."4 However, this definition excludes any
person elected to a state government office or serving on an elected
at their result); Adam M. Mycyk, Comment, United States Fair Employment Law in the
Transnational Employment Arena: The Case for the Extraterritorial Application of Title VII of the
Civil RightsAct of.1964, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 1109 (1990) (urging the Supreme Court to afford great
deference to the EEOC's interpretation and apply Title VII extraterritorially).
8. H.R. 1694, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); see 137 CONG. REc. H2135 (1991); see also
infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
9. Pub. L No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
President Bush signed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 on November 21, 1991. The Act is effective as
of this date and, as a result, there is a window of cases between the date of the EEOC v. Arabian
American Oil Co. decision, and November 21, 1991, where Title VII will be held not to apply to
American workers for American corporations abroad. See infra part IV.C (discussing the legal
ramifications of the new civil rights legislation).
10. 111 S. CL 1227.
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official's personal staff.15 Employers are subject to Title VII if
they employ more than fifteen employees in an industry affecting
commerce. 16  Commerce includes: trade, transportation, or
communication between the states, or between a state and any
location outside thereof, or between points within a single state
traversing through a point outside thereof.1  An "industry
affecting commerce" encompasses any governmental industry or
activity and any private activity in business in which a labor
dispute could potentially disrupt the free flow of commerce or any
governmental industry or activity."
Title VII prescribes situations in which employers are exempt
from compliance with its provisions. For example, U.S.
corporations employing alien workers abroad are not required to
adhere to the standards of Title VII with respect to their alien
employees.1 9 In addition, religious or educational organizations
employing individuals of a particular religion to carry out the
organization's activities are exempted.2" Title VII also creates an
affirmative defense for an employer accused of employment
discrimination under the "bona fide occupational qualification"
(BFOQ) exception.21
Congress vested the power to administer and enforce Title VII
primarily in the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission
15. § 2000e(O; cf § 2000e-16 (stating the rules governing employment discrimination by the
federal government).
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) ("The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce.. . and any agent of such a person, but such term does not include (1) the
United States, [or] a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States ....
17. § 2000e(g).
18. § 2000e(h).
19. § 2000e-I ("This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to the
employment of aliens outside any state .... -).
20. § 2000e-1. Title VII lists a number of other situations in which employers or groups are
exempted from compliance with its provisions. For example, a bona fide private membership club
(other than a labor organization) that is exempt from specific federal taxation is also exempt from
Title VII. § 2000e(b).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). A BFOQ exception allows an employer to fill certain positions
with persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin if the employer can show that this criteria
is an actual qualification for performing the job. § 2000e-2(e).
420
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(EEOC).22 Title VII provides explicit methods and protocol
directing the EEOC in their duties.' Generally, the grievance
process starts with an employee filing a complaint. Thereafter, the
EEOC conducts an investigation to assess whether there is
reasonable cause to believe that the employer engaged in
employment discrimination.24 Upon finding cause to believe that
the employer violated Title VII, the EEOC attempts to rectify the
employee's grievance with his or her employer.' If the attempt
to rectify the situation is unsuccessful, the agency may choose to
litigate the matter on behalf of the employee.26 In the event that
the agency decides not to litigate, the aggrieved employee may file
a civil action in federal court.27
B. Administrative Interpretation
On numerous occasions, the EEOC has interpreted Title VII as
encompassing American citizens employed by American companies
abroad.28 In an opinion letter regarding the extraterritorial
application of the Act, the EEOC's General Counsel stressed that
if Title VII's alien exemption clause29 is to have any meaning at
all, it necessarily includes American citizens working abroad for
U.S. corporations, while at the same time exempting alien
workers.3" Additionally, in 1988, during hearings on the proposed
amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
22. See § 2000e-4. However, Title VII vests the U.S. Department of Justice with authority to
represent the EEOC, as a party, in cases before the U.S. Supreme Court. § 2000e-4.
23. § 2000e-5(b) to (f).
24. § 2000e-5(b) to (e).
25. § 2000e-5(f).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f). If the EEOC has been unsuccessful in rectifying the situation and
the respondent is a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, the EEOC is required
to cease action and refer the case to the Attorney General. § 2000e-5(1).
27. § 2000e-5(f).
28. See, e.g., EEOC Dec. No. 85-16,2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 6857, at 7070-75 (Sept.
16, 1985); Interpretation § 622.5, EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 3804 (Jan. 1982); Dec. No. 90-1, 2
Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 6875 (Apr. 10, 1990).
29. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-1. See supra note 19 (stating the alien exemption provision).
30. See Harold Levy, Note, Civil Rights in Employment and the Multinational Corporations,
10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 87,104 (1976) (discussing opinion letter from William Carey, EEOC General
Counsel, to Senator Frank Church (Mar. 14, 1975)).
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(ADEA), 1 Clarence Thomas, then Chairman of the EEOC, urged
Congress to amend the ADEA to provide coverage for acts of age
discrimination occurring overseas.32 Thomas argued that Congress
should bring the ADEA in line with the employment protections of
Title VII, which the EEOC and the federal district courts had
previously construed to apply to discrimination occurring outside
the United States.
33
The U.S. Department of Justice, the agency with secondary
enforcement responsibility under Title VII, concurred with the
EEOC's position. In 1975, during a debate over a proposal to
prohibit U.S. employers from participating in foreign boycotts
requiring employment discrimination based on religion, then
Assistant Attorney General, Antonin Scalia, testified that Title VII
already applied to American citizens working for American
corporations abroad and, therefore, the proposal was
unnecessary.' Scalia pointed out that this conclusion was
supported by the clause exempting aliens employed by U.S.
companies abroad from Title VII protections, which, by negative
inference, implied that Congress intended Title VII to apply
abroad.35
C. Supreme Court Rulings on Statutory Interpretation and the
Extraterritorial Effect of Legislation
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently affirmed
congressional power to enact legislation regulating actions beyond
31. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
32. Age Discrimination and Overseas Americans, 1983: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Aging of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1983)
(statement of Clarence Thomas, Chairman, EEOC).
33. Id. Besides stressing the past treatment of Title VII by the courts and the EEOC, Thomas
argued that the alien exemption clause by negative implication necessarily expressed congressional
intent to extend the Act extraterritorialiy. The reason it was necessary to amend the ADEA for similar
treatment was because it lacked a similar alien exemption clause. I
34. Foreign Investment and Arab Boycott Legislation, 1975 Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on International Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 165 (1975) (testimony of Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General).
35. Id.
422
1992 / EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.
the U.S. borders.3 6 In assessing a statute's extraterritorial
operation, the Court has historically presumed that the statute
applies only to actions within the U.S., absent a contrary
congressional intent.37  Throughout this century, the Supreme
Court has applied two levels of the presumption against
extraterritoriality:38 when the extraterritorial application of a
statute interfered with foreign law, and disrupted international
comity, the Court required Congress to clearly express an
affirmative intention to apply the statute abroad.39 However, when
there was no such interference, the Court has relied on a variety of
sources to discern congressional intent.4"
The frequently quoted Foley Bros. v. Filardo4t case clearly
expressed the presumption against extraterritorial application of
statutes. In Foley Bros., the U.S. Supreme Court declined to
enforce the Eight Hour Law42 against an American contractor who
hired American citizens for construction projects in Iran and Iraq.
36. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282 (1952) (imposing trademark
infringement liability on a U.S. citizen who registered an existing U.S. trademark abroad and
subsequently interfered with commerce within the U.S.); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421,
426 (1932) (upholding the imposition of fines on an American citizen abroad for failure to obey a
subpoena in a criminal case); see also RESTATEmENT (I-mD) op FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
U.S. §§ 401-404 (1987) (giving restrictions on the application of a statute abroad).
37. See Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,285 (1949) (discussing the presumption against
extraterritoriality).
38. Compare Benz v. Compania Naviera Hildalgo, SA. 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957) (finding
that the Labor Management Relations Act cannot be applied to foreign-flag ships absent a clear
expression of congressional intent to apply the Act to these foreign ships) and McCulloch v. Sociedad
Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963) (clear expression of congressional intent
required to apply the National Labor Relations Act extraterfitorially) with Steele v. Bulova Watch
Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (allowing the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127,
to apply abroad absent a clear expression that the Act be enforced extraterritorially) and Skiriotes v.
Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941) (allowing extraterritorial application of a Florida criminal statute
fixing its marine boundaries and regulating them as approved by Congress absent a clear expression
by Congress that the State could regulate beyond international boundaries).
39. Schulte, supra note 7, at 372. This application of the presumption is referred to as the
"clear statement test." Id
40. Chociey, supra note 7, at 92. The Court generally looks to the language of the statute, its
legislative history, and administrative interpretations. 1d at 92 n.8. This application of the
presumption against extraterritoriality is referred to as the *'weak presumption." Id at 122.
41. 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
42. Ch. 352, 27 Stat. 340 (1892) (codified at 40 U.S.C. §§ 321-326), repealed by Contract
Work Hours and Safety Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-581, 76 Stat. 360 (1962) (codified at 40 U.S.C.
§§ 327-333 (1988)).
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The Eight Hour Law required employers to pay 1.5 times the basic
hourly rate for work performed in excess of eight hours per day.4"
The law applied to any employee of the U.S. government or any
contractor employed on a public work of the United States."
The Supreme Court began its analysis by acknowledging that
Congress had the power to impose such a standard abroad and that
the only issue requiring resolution in the case was whether
Congress intended the Eight Hour Law to apply abroad.45 In
denying extraterritorial application of the Eight Hour Law, the
Court relied on the historic canon of construction that, absent an
expression of contrary congressional intent, legislation is presumed
to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.46 The Court found that nothing in the language or
legislative history of the law indicated that Congress had any
intention other than the usual domestic application of the law.47
In addition, an intent to apply the law domestically was apparent
in the legislative history since the law was enacted to improve
labor conditions in the U.S. and to fight the influx of cheaper
foreign labor.4" Furthermore, the absence of any distinction
between laborers who were U.S. citizens and laborers who were
aliens indicated a strictly domestic application. Otherwise, the Act
would have embraced any citizen of a foreign country who
happened to be employed on a U.S. public work project abroad.49
The Court declined to imply that Congress intended such a broad
application of the law because, traditionally, a host country was the
primary enforcer of labor regulations.5 " Finally, the Court noted
that there was no executive interpretation or Department of Justice
decision that would contradict the Court's holding."
43. 336 U.S. at 283 (citing 40 U.S.C. § 325a).
44. Id at 284 (citing 40 U.S.C. § 321).
45. Id at 284-85.
46. Id. at 285.
47. Id at 285-86.
48. 336 U.S. at 286-88.
49. Id at 286-88.
50. Id. at 288.
51. Id at 287-91.
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The Court reaffirmed congressional power to enact legislation
with extraterritorial effect, when regulating the conduct of U.S.
nationals, in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.52 The case involved
Sidney Steele, a U.S. citizen, who obtained a Mexican registration
of the Bulova trademark, which had long been registered in the
U.S. by the Bulova Watch Company, Inc., [hereinafter Bulova].
Thereafter, Steele assembled and sold, in Mexico City, watches
stamped with the Bulova trademark with the purpose of deceiving
the Mexican buying public.53 The watches, which were partially
composed of parts obtained in the U.S., eventually ended up in
commerce within U.S. borders in violation of the Lanham
Trademark Act of 1946.54 Bulova brought suit under the Act for
trademark infringement and sought to enjoin Steele from using
their trade-name on watches assembled in Mexico. The U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed the case
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, based on its interpretation
that the Act was to apply domestically only. The court of appeals
reversed,55 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari,55 affirming
the appellate court's decision.57
The Supreme Court relied on the broad jurisdictional language
in the Lanham Trademark Act to overcome the presumption that
the statute only applied domestically. 5 The statute's express intent
was to protect validly registered trademarks used in commerce
from interference and unfair competition.59 Commerce is defined
in the Act as "all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by
Congress."' Because Steele's products affected commerce within
the U.S., and Congress has the supreme power to regulate
commerce among the states, the Court held that application of the
52. 344 U.S. 280, 289 (1952).
53. Id. at 281-82.
54. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988). The purpose of this Act is to protect individuals from
unfair competition and from misuse of their validly registered trade-names by others. § 1127.
55. Bulova Watch Co. v. Steele, 194 F.2d 567, 573 (5th Cir. 1952).
56. 343 U.S. 962 (1952).
57. 344 U.S. at 289.
58. 344 U.S. at 283-84.
59. Id at 286-87.
60. Id at 287.
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Act in this case was proper.61 Furthermore, the jurisdictional grant
to the district courts of the U.S., to hold liable any person who
infringes on a registered trademark, was valid in this case because
there was no interference with the sovereignty of another nation.62
In contrast to the previous two decisions, in the 1963 case of
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras,63 the
Supreme Court spent most of its analysis discussing potential
international conflicts that could materialize if the National Labor
Relations Act' applied abroad. The Court concluded that
Congress intended that the Act apply only within the United States.
In its opinion, the Court relied upon the principal of jurisprudence,
that "an act of Congress ought never be construed to violate the
law of nations if any other possible construction remains .... ,65
Because defendant's vessels flew the flag of a foreign nation, it
was not required to adhere to Title VII.' That defendant's vessels
were owned by foreign subsidiaries of an American corporation and
that they frequently sailed between the U.S. and Latin America did
not alter the result.67 In addition, the Court assessed the foreign
outcry over the potential application of the law to foreign-flag
ships. Because application was also contrary to the State
Department regulations regarding foreign vessels, the Court refused
to apply the Act outside the U.S., absent an explicit expression of
congressional intent to the contrary." However, the Court
remarked that its decision should in no way be interpreted to limit
the sovereignty of the U.S. or the power of Congress, the branch
61. I. at 286-89.
62. Id. at 285. The Court noted that prior to their ruling in this case a court in Mexico had
ruled to nullify Steele's Mexican trademark registration, and therefore there was no conflict between
U.S. and Mexican law. Id.
63. 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
64. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1988). This act was intended to facilitate the free flow of
commerce by encouraging the practice of collective bargaining and protecting the freedom of
employees to associate and negotiate for their employment benefits. § 151.
65. 372 U.S. at 21 (quoting The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804)). The Court
noted that it is a "well-established rule of international law that the law of the flag state ordinarily
governs the international affairs of a ship.- Id. at 118.
66. Id. at 20-22.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 19-22.
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of government better suited to handle such important policy
decisions."'Seeking to understand congressional intent, the Supreme Court
traditionally accorded great deference to the interpretation of a
statute by an administrative agency charged with the statute's
administration. ° Recognized exceptions to this rule are engaged
when the application of agency guidelines or decisions violates the
obvious congressional intent, or when strong indications
demonstrate that the agency's interpretation is incorrect.71 Courts,
however, usually defer to formal agency decisions as well as
informal interpretations of the statute by the agency.72
Prior to Aramco, which is discussed in Part III, there were two
important Supreme Court rulings denying deference to EEOC's
interpretation of Title VII. 7a The first case was Espinoza v. Farah
Manufacturing Co.74 In Espinoza, petitioner claimed that Farah
Manufacturing Company in Texas denied her employment because
of her Mexican citizenship, and that under Title VII, as interpreted
by the EEOC, this denial was tantamount to discrimination based
on national origin.75 The Court found that, although Title VII
protected aliens residing in the U.S. from employment
discrimination, the petitioner in this case was denied employment
because she was not yet a U.S. citizen, not because of her country
of origin.76 The majority of the Court rejected the EEOC's
definition of national origin, stating that the term did not embrace
69. Id. at 22. This holding is consistent with Lauritzen v. Larson, 345 U.S. 571 (1953), in
which the Court directed the parties to seek a remedy from Congress, which '"alone has the facilities
necessary to make fairly such an important policy decision." See id. at 593.
70. Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 389
(1984); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279 (1976).
71. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1973).
72. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 433-34 (The EEOC should be afforded
deference not only for its formal regulations but also for its administrative guidelines).
73. 111 S. Ct. at 1234-35.
74. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
75. Id. at 87.
76. Id. at 96.
427
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citizenship.77 The Court noted that the EEOC was normally
afforded deference in interpreting the statutes it administered;
however, since in this case the EEOC's position was contrary to
the obvious intent of Congress, the Court did not follow this
interpretation.78 The Court found that Congress did not intend to
extend the definition of national origin to citizenship because they
had never expressed an intent to repeal the requirement of U.S.
citizenship for federal employment, nor could such congressional
intent be inferred from its actions."
Although the Court denied that petitioner had a justiciable
case,"0 it established that Title VII does protect resident aliens."
Congress inclusion of the alien exception clause in Title VII,
denying application of the Act to aliens residing abroad, supported
the Court's holding; the Court found, through negative inference,
that Congress intended Title VII to apply to aliens residing in the
United States.82
77. The Court left open the question of whether, under different circumstances, discrimination
based on citizenship could amount to discrimination based on national origin. The holding was
limited to facts in this case which showed that more than 96% of the Farah work force was of
Mexican ancestry and did the work for which Mrs. Espinoza applied. Id, at 92.
78. Id. at 92-95.
79. Id See MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135,1149 (3rd Cir. 1988) (supporting
the same distinction between national origin and citizenship). In MacNamara, the court held that, due
to a treaty between the United States and Korea, Korean Air Lines was free to discriminate based on
citizenship when hiring its executive personnel. Id at 1148; see Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389,
392-93 (7th Cir. 1991) (recently affirming the position in MacNamara). See generally Steven Mark
Tapper, Note, Building on MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines: Extending Title VII to Foreign
Employers Operating Under Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, 24 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 757 (1991) (arguing for an extension of the MacNamara holding).
80. A justiciable case refers to **[a] controversy, in which a present and fixed claim of right
is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it; rights must be declared upon existing state
of facts and not upon state of facts that may or may not arise in future." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY
865 (6th ed. 1990). In Espinoza, since the Court found that the petitioner was not discriminated
against based on her national origin, she failed to present the Court with a redressable injury. 414
U.S. at 96. Absent a showing of an actual controversy, a court will dismiss a plaintiff's complaint.
81. 414 U.S. at 95.
82. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1972)). The Court found further support for its holding
in the Code of Federal Regulations which states, "Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects
all individuals, both citizens and noncitizens, domiciled or residing in the United States against
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id at 95 n.8 (quoting §
1606.1(c)).
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In comparison, in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,3 the Court
used a more measured test to deny deference to the EEOC. In
Gilbert, the plaintiffs argued that the Court should give great
deference to the guidelines set by the EEOC, which supported their
discrimination case.84 The Court rejected this contention, stating
that EEOC's guidelines were not controlling and that the test for
assessing their weight was that stated in Skidmore v. Swift. 5 In
Swift, the Court stated that an administrative guideline should be
analyzed according to the "thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give
power to persuade, if lacking power to control." 86 Applying this
test, the Court in Gilbert held that EEOC's position lacked the
consistency and persuasiveness to control in the case.8 7
III. THE CASE
A. The Facts
Ali Boureslan, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Lebanon, was
employed by the Arabian American Oil Company (AAOC) as an
engineer.88 He started to work for AAOC in 1979, at its Houston
83. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). The Court held that General Electric's policy of excluding
pregnancy-related disabilities from its health benefits package did not constitute sex discrimination
in violation of Title VII. ALa t 145-46. The Court noted that plaintiffs did not meet their burden of
proof since they failed to establish that the exclusion of pregnancy benefits was a pretext for
discriminating against women, and not merely the exclusion of a typical disease or disability.
Discrimination based on gender is not established by showing that an employer's benefits are less
than all-inclusive. Id at 138-39.
84. Id at 140.
85. Id at 141; see 323 U.S. 134 (1944). The Court in Skidmore said, 'We consider that the
rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon
the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance." 323 U.S. at 140.
86. 429 U.S. at 142 (quoting 323 U.S. at 140).
87. Id. at 141-46. In its holding, the Court stressed that the EEOC guidelines, upon which the
petitioner sought to rely, were not voiced by the EEOC until eight years after the enactment of Title
VII. lk4 at 142. These guidelines directly conflicted with an earlier pronouncement by the EEOC as
expressed in an opinion letter by the General Counsel of the EEOC, dated October 17, 1966. Id.
88. 111 S. Ct. at 1230.
429
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office, and in 1980 was transferred, pursuant to his own request, to
Saudi Arabia." Boureslan alleged that for the next four years he
was the victim of racial and religious harassment from his
supervisor.90 In June 1984, AAOC dismissed Boureslan, allegedly
for poor work performance.9
Thereafter, Boureslan filed a claim with the EEOC against
AAOC, alleging a Title VII violation.' Before the EEOC ruled
on the merits, Boureslan initiated a suit in federal district court in
Texas, alleging that AAOC had violated Title VII by discriminating
based on race, religion, and national origin.9' This claim was
dismissed by the district court on the basis of lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction, because Title VII protections were held to not extend
to American citizens employed abroad by American employers. 94
The court of appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to both Boureslan and the EEOC.95
B. The Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority of the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded that Title VII did not apply extraterritorially to prohibit
discrimination in the employment practices of U.S. companies
abroad.96 Since Title VII neither states specifically that it should
be applied abroad nor does it specifically deny such an application,
the Court was required to interpret the intent of Congress upon
89. Id.
90. Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014, 1016 (Sth Cir. 1988).
91. ICE
92. See Brief of the International Human Rights Law Group as Amicus Curiae in Support of
the Position of the Petitioner at *5, EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. CL 1227 (1991)
(Nos. 89-1838, 89-1845), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File.
93. Boureslan v. Aramco, Arabian American Oil Co., 653 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Tex. 1987),
aftid, 857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1988), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990).
Boureslan sought relief under Title VII and state law for the allegedly discriminatory treatment
suffered while in Saudi Arabia. 653 F. Supp. at 629.
94. 653 F. Supp. at 630. The Fifth Circuit panel granted the EEOC's motion to intervene.
95. Boureslan v Aramco, Arabian American Oil Co., 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990), cert.
granted sub nor., EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. CL 40 (1991).
96. 111 S. CL at 1231-32, 36.
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enacting Title VII.97 Rehnquist based the Court's decision on
adherence to the long-established canon of construction that
legislation is presumed to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the U.S., unless a contrary intent of Congress can be
proven.98 The Court stated that the purpose of this canon of
construction is to protect against unintended conflicts between U.S.
laws and those of other nations which could result in international
friction.99
In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected both of
petitioners' arguments of statutory construction. The petitioners first
argued that Title VI's broad jurisdictional language established
congressional intent to extend the coverage of the statute beyond
the territorial boundaries of the United States. 1 ° Title VII defines
employer as "a person engaged in the industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees . . . 10 Commerce is
defined as "trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, transmission,
or communication among the several States; or between a State and
any place outside thereof . . . .""2 Specifically, petitioners
argued that this jurisdictional language evinced congressional intent
to protect employees from discrimination anywhere in the world by
an American employer who affects trade "between a State and any
place outside thereof."" 3
The respondents' argued that the scope of Title VII was
exclusively domestic.0 5 The clause defining commerce was
intended to embrace any commerce "not wholly within a single
State, presumably as it affects both interstate and foreign
97. Id. at 1230. The parties conceded that Congress has the power to enact legislation that is
enforceable beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States. Id.
98. Id. (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). See supra text
accompanying notes 41-51 (discussing Foley).
99. Id. (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-22
(1962)); see supra text accompanying notes 63-69 (discussing McCulloch).
100. Id. at 1231.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
102. § 2000e(g).
103. § 2000e(g).
104. 111 S. CL at 1230. The respondents were two Delaware corporations, Arabian American
Oil Co. (AAOC), and its subsidiary Arareco Service Company. Id.
105. Id. at 1231.
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commerce," but not conduct solely within a foreign country."°'
The respondents stressed that Title VII failed to mention commerce
in foreign nations, in contrast to Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, which included this language. 7 Furthermore, the original
House bill contained the terms "foreign commerce" and "foreign
nations," but these terms were deleted prior to the Senate
enactment of the bill into law. Respondents concluded that this
deletion was contrary to any intention of extraterritorial
application.' °8
Although the Court found that both arguments had merit, it held
that the ambiguous language of the statute did not speak directly
to the issue presented and, therefore, was insufficient to clearly
establish congressional intent for extraterritorial application of Title
VII. 9 The Court noted that the language in this Act was the
same boilerplate language which could be found in a number of
domestic statutes that had no application overseas."0 An extreme
example of this was found in New York Central Railroad Co. v.
Chisholm,.. in which the Supreme Court ruled that, despite the
explicit reference to "foreign commerce" within the Federal
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1231. Title HI defines commerce as -'travel, trade, traffic ... among the several
states... or between any foreign country or any territory or possession... but through any other
State... or a foreign country." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c). Title II was enacted to allow injunctive relief
for victims of discrimination in public accommodations. § 2000a(a).
108. 111 S. Ct. at 1231.
109. Id. at 1231-32. See Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEo. L.J. 53, 74-77 (1991)
(speculating that Aramco may have been guided by the Court's attempt to preserve discrimination
in a foreign country when the facts were varied from the actual facts of the case). "What if plaintiff
had been an American Jew? How could American employers do business comfortably in Saudi
Arabia if not permitted to discriminate against Jewish American employees?" Id. Weinberg sees this
as a vivid example of how comity can mean accommodation to values repugnant to this country. Id
"If the economic stake in this sort of 'comity' influenced the Court, the Court was embarrassed
enough not to mention it. Instead, the Court offered inconclusive legislative history and implausible
readings of the text." Id at 74-76.
110. Id; see, e.g., Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321 (1988); Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 402 (1988); Consumer Product
Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2052a(12) (1988).
111. 268 U.S. 29 (1925).
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Employers Liability Act (FELA),'1 2 an employee injured on the
job outside the U.S. was not protected under FELA."3 In
Chisholm, the Court concluded that broad jurisdictional language
alone is insufficient to clearly disclose congressional intent to apply
FELA abroad." 4
The Court, inAramco, further rejected an analogy between Title
VII's broad language and the broad language in the Lanham
Trademark Act,"' which was previously held to apply
extraterritorially in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. 1  Justice
Rehnquist wrote that the Lanham Trademark Act" 7  was
distinguishable from Title VII because the former expressly granted
jurisdiction "to the extent of Congress's power over
commerce. 1 1. On the other hand, Title VII jurisdiction was
limited to the enumerated situations listed in that Act. 19
Furthermore, Title VII's boilerplate language was lifted from the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,1 20 which, in
1963, the Court found not to apply abroad."'
The petitioners' second argument focused on the alien
exemption clause of Title VII, which says that the statute "shall
not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens
outside any State."' 2 Petitioners argued that by negative
inference the exemption clause expressed congressional intent to
112. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988). FELA provides railroad employees while engaging in interstate
or foreign commerce or commerce between "any of the States or Territories and any foreign nation
or nations" a cause of action against their employer for injuries resulting from their employment. §
51.
113. 111 S. Ct. at 1232. In Chisholn, a U.S. employee of a U.S. railroad company was denied
a damages cause of action under FELA for a fatal injury sustained 30 miles north of the U.S. border
into Canada. 268 U.S. at 31.
114. 268 U.S. at 31.
115. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127.
116. 344 U.S. 280 (1952). See supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text (discussing Steele).
117. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127.
118. 111 S. CL at 1232-33.
119. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17.
120. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988).
121. See MeCuiloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 15 (1962)
(holding the National Labor Relations Act did not apply extraterritorially).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1.
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protect, under Title VII, U.S. citizens employed abroad." 3
Specifically, petitioners argued that inclusion of the alien
exemption clause manifests Congress intent for extraterritorial
application, because otherwise this exemption was not necessary
since aliens within the U.S. are included in Title VII's definition
of employee.2 This negative inference was the basis for many
district court rulings prior to Boureslan's lawsuit."z
Respondents retorted that the alien exception clause was not
without meaning under their interpretation since the provision could
be read as a reaffirnance, by negative implication, that aliens
within the U.S. were covered under the definition of employee. 26
Title VII defines employee as "an individual employed by an
employer," specifically leaving out any reference to
citizenship. 27 In the alternative, respondents argued that the
clause, when read in conjunction with respondents' interpretation
of the definition of commerce, excluded those aliens that were
employed within the possessions of the U.S. and not within the
traditional jurisdictional control of the U.S. 12 The respondents
based this analysis on earlier decisions of the Court, holding that
possessions of the U.S. included U.S. controlled leased bases in
foreign countries.'29 The Court, in addressing the alien exception
clause, again pointed to the ambiguity in the language of the Act
and held that the clause did not clearly express an intent to apply
Title VII to Americans working abroad. 130 The Court noted that
if petitioners' argument was accepted, there was nothing in Title
123. 111 S. CL at 1233.
124. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 14 (defining employee under Title VII).
125. See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text (discussing the analysis in Espinoza of the
alien exception clause in which the Court drew a negative inference, thereby finding congressional
intent to extend Title VII protections to resident aliens); see also supra note 2 (citing cases that
support the application of Title VII to Americans abroad).
126. 111 S. CL at 1234.
127, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(t).
128. 111 S. CL at 1233-34.
129. See id. (citing Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Conneli, 335 U.S. 377 (1948)). Respondents in
Aramco "conclude that the alien exemption provision was included to 'limit the impact of Vermilya-
Brown by excluding from coverage employers of aliens in areas under U.S. control that' were not
encompassed under Title VII's definition of the term 'State.' - Id; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(i)
(defining "state" under Title VII).
130. 111 S. CL at 1234.
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VII that would limit application of the law only to U.S. businesses
employing American citizens abroad, and it would arguably extend
to foreign employers of U.S. citizens in their own countries."'
The Court felt that this prospect would create difficult issues of
international law and policy, which should only be addressed by
Congress.3 Further, the absence of any provision in Title VII
dealing with future potential conflicts with foreign law and the lack
of any defined means of enforcement abroad substantiated a purely
domestic application of the statute.133
The Court also refused to defer to EEOC's reading of Title
VII,1 34 interpreting the Act to apply abroad because the position
failed the test for deference defined in General Electric Co v.
Gilbert.1 35 The Court noted that EEOC's position had fluctuated
in its interpretation of the extraterritorial application of Title VII
and that, in an earlier pronouncement, the EEOC voiced the
opinion that Title VII was a purely domestic statute.136 This
discrepancy, coupled with the lack of support by a plain reading of
the language of the statute, made EEOC's present interpretation
insufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterritorial
application. 137
The Court's final conclusion was that it was solely
congressional province to extend the coverage of Title VII
abroad. 13  Congress need only follow the amendment procedure
131. Id. The Court noted that this interpretation might mean that a French employer of a United
States citizen in France would be subject to Title VIL Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text (discussing the EEOC's position on the
extraterritorial application of Title VII).
135. 429 U.S. at 141. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text (discussing the holding
In Gilbert).
136. 111 S.Ct. at 1235 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1601.1(c) (1971)). The original pronouncements of
the EEOC did not include an expression of extraterritorial application. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 5
it used with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA)'39 to obtain this result."4°
C. The Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia joined in the majority opinion, except for the
portion asserting that deference to the EEOC should be determined
by the test in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.' Scalia stated that
the Court's more recent decision in EEOC v. Commercial Office
Products Co.,141 which held that "the EEOC's interpretation of
ambiguous language need only be reasonable to be entitled
deference," should be followed. 143 Under this less stringent test,
he concluded that the EEOC should be given deference in this
case.1" However, Justice Scalia said, "deference is not
abdication," and since the EEOC position in this case is based on
legislative implication, it is not weighty enough to overcome the
presumption against extraterritorial application.15 Therefore, he
joined with the majority.
D. The Dissenting Opinion
Writing for the dissent, Justice Marshall argued that the
majority had turned the presumption against extraterritorial
application into a definite rule requiring an explicit statement by
Congress. 146 In doing so, the majority had tossed out "all the
139. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. In amending the ADEA, Congress expressly extended the definition
of employee to encompass a U.S. employee working for an employer in a foreign country.
Additionally, Congress created a conflict of law exception releasing employers from compliance in
the event that such compliance would cause the employer to violate the laws of the foreign country.
§ 623(0.
140. 111 S. C. at 1235-36.
141. Id. at 1237.
142. 486 U.S. 107 (1988).
143. Id. at 115.
144. 111 S. CL at 1237 (Scalia, 3., concurring).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1237-46 (Blackmun and Stevens, JJ, joining). According to the dissent, the Court
has traditionally applied two forms of the presumption against extraterritoriality. Id. When application
of the statute abroad would affect only American nationals, the Court has applied a weak
presumption. Prior to applying the weak presumption, the Court first looked to all indicia of
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traditional tools" of statutory interpretation, in exchange for a
litmus test that ignored the historical weight accorded all indicia of
legislative intent.147 Specifically, the majority misread the
legislative history and language of the statute, and, consequently,
arrived at the wrong result.148 The dissent concluded that when
all indicia of congressional intent were given weight and combined
with the alien exemption clause, the presumption against
extraterritorial application was overcome. 149
IV. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
15 0
A. What Should American Employees and Employers Abroad
Consider in Light of the Court's Ruling?
Following Aramco, a U.S. citizen who is subject to
discrimination abroad, at the hands of an American employer, still
has options for recovery. For instance, the ADEA explicitly
provides for a cause of action for age discrimination in the U.S.
and abroad."15 For discrimination based on race, religion, sex, and
national origin, or for wrongful termination, the foreign host
legislative intent, including statutory construction, legislative history, and administrative
interpretations. Id. at 1237-38. Justice Marshall asserted that this is the process that should be
followed here, not the strong presumption which the majority used. l at 1240.
147. Id at 1237. For arguments supporting the dissent's opinion, see Schulte, supra note 7, at
370-76; Chociey, supra note 7, at 120-26.
148. 111 S. Ct. at 1238-40 (concluding that if the weak presumption were used, there is no
question that the legislative history and administrative interpretations support the application of Title
VII abroad). Id Additionally, the dissent criticized the majority's refusal to defer to EEOC's
interpretation of Title VII. The majority took the statement by the EEOC that all individuals residing
in the U.S., whether citizens are not, are protected by Title VII as necessarily excluding those citizens
residing abroad. The dissent felt that in light of the enforcement history of Title VIL and other formal
statements issued subsequent to this opinion, the EEOC did not intend what the majority had read
into the simple statement. Id at 1246.
149. Id. at 1240-46.
150. In light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the holding in Aramco is limited to the period
between this decision and November 21, 1991, when the new civil rights legislation was enacted. See
infra part IV.C (discussing the broader ramifications of the new civil rights legislation).
151. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623-630(0.
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country may offer protection under its laws. 152 For example, in
Cleary v. United States Lines,153 the plaintiff originally filed suit
with the London Industrial Tribunal for wrongful termination. The
parties settled out of court, leaving only the balance of Cleary's
claim for age discirifiination to be decided within the United
States. 54 American citizens could also potentially recover on
contract or tort theories. For example, an employee who relies on
a general statement of company policies, professing
nondiscrinination in the workplace, may have an implied
nondiscriminatory employment contract that is not affected by his
loss of Title VII protections. 15
5
To take advantage of the Supreme Court's decision in Aramco,
employers would have had to take extra precautions to separate
their management decisions made within the U.S. from those made
abroad. Otherwise, as the Florida District Court in EEOC v.
Bermuda Star Line1 56 held, an employer is required to comply
152. Eg., Saudi Arabian Labour and Workmen Regulations of 1969, Royal Decree No. m/21:
Labour Code (Nov. 15, 1969). Article 91(a) of the Saudi Labour Code obliges an employer to "treat
his employees with respect and refrain from any word or act that may affect their dignity or
religion." Under article 22 of the Saudi Labour Code, practices inconsistent with the freedom to work
are illegal. The Code also gives relief for wrongful discharge. Brief of the International Human
Rights Law Group as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Position of the Petitioner at *15, Aramco
(Nos. 89-1838, 89-1845), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File. Many foreign countries
have enacted similar antidiscrimination laws, the impact of which will turn on whether American
citizens have standing under those laws. Compare Employers Equity Act, ch. 31, 1986 S.C. 1065
(Can.) with TRFATY ESTABLSHINO THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY art. 119 and Sex
Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65 (Eng.); see also LABOR LAW CoMM. OF THE SECTION ON BUsINESs
LAW OF THE INT'L BAR ASS'N, INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT (Dr.
Claude Serge Aronstein ed. 1976) (providing an overview of the hiring and firing practices in 29
countries, as well as, available legal remedies for the employee).
153. 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984), superseded by statute as stated in De Yoreo v. Bell
Helicopter Textron, Inc., 785 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1986). The court's holding in Cleary, that the
ADEA was limited to the geographic area of the United States, provided the impetus for the
amending of the ADEA in 1984. Aramco, 111 S. CL at 1235-36. The ADEA was amended by the
Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984. Pub. L No. 98-456, 98 Stat. 1792 (1984) (codified at
5 U.S.C. § 1501 and 29 U.S.C. §§ 630-631, 633, 1501, and in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
154. 728 F.2d at 608.
155. This type of recovery would depend on the law of the state of incorporation. California
allows recovery on both theories. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988)
(holding that an employee's promise to work for, or actual performance of, serviee for an employer
over time may support an employer's promise to refrain from arbitrary dismissal, thereby creating
an implied-in-fact contract that is actionable by the employee if breached).
156. 744 F. Supp. 1109, 1113 (M.D. Fla. 1990).
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with Title VII for its decisions made in the U.S. concerning
employment positions abroad. 157 In that case, the plaintiff was
denied employment on Bermuda's cruise line as a seaman on deck,
based on her gender.' The hiring criteria for such a position
required that the applicant be male. 159 The court held that
Boureslan v. Aramco, Arabian American Oil Co.'6° was not
controlling. In contrast to Boureslan, in Bermuda Star Line there
was no question as to the extraterritorial application of Title VII
because the discrimination took place within the United States.
Therefore, the employer was required to abide by Title VII in its
hiring practices. 16
1
In summary, employees who wish to pursue an employment
discrimination suit against their employers should look beyond
Title VII. Other remedies may be provided by host countries, and
other potential state law causes of action may exist, such as an
implied contract. Also, employers seeking to rebut a Title VII suit
on the basis of the Aramco decision need to establish that the
discrimination did not occur within the U.S. to effectively raise this
shield to liability.
B. The Effect on Other Legislation of the Court's Statutory
Analysis Approach in Aramco
Since the decision in Aramco, federal courts have used the
standards enunciated by the Supreme Court to deny the application
of other U.S. legislation extraterritorially. For example, in Smith v.
United States,6 2 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
relied on the Court's decision in Aramco. As a result, the court in
Smith refused to draw a negative inference from the language of
157. Id.
158. IM at 1110.
159. Id.
160. 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc),aff'd,Aramco, 11 S. Ct. 1227 (1991). See supra
notes 93-95 (listing case history).
161. 744 F. Supp. at 1113.
162. 932 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1991).
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the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). 163 Consequently, the court
denied appellant, Sandra Jean Smith, recovery for the alleged
wrongful death of her husband, which resulted from negligent acts
or omissions by the U.S. government in Antarctica.164 The FTCA
exempts any claim arising in a foreign country."65
Therefore, the issue in Smith was whether Antarctica, a
sovereignless region, is a foreign country within the exception and,
if not, whether Congress intended to allow a cause of action for a
tort arising from the negligence of the U.S. government in this
distant location." Appellant argued that since Antarctica is not
a foreign country, and, therefore, not specifically exempted under
the language of the FTCA, Congress intended to include all other
stateless regions not embraced under the concept of a foreign
country."6 The court ultimately held that even if Antarctica was
not a foreign country under the statute, the presumption against
extraterritorial application was not sufficiently outweighed by a
showing of any contrary congressional intent.'
61
Similarly to Smith, the court in Environmental Defense Fund v.
Massey169 ruled that the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA)"70  did not apply extraterritorially. Therefore, the court
lacked jurisdiction to enjoin incineration at the National Science
163. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2680. This act abrogates the federal government's immunity from
tort liability and establishes the conditions for litigation against the federal government. § 1346(b).
Governmental immunity is preserved in regards to some traditional intentional torts, and certain acts
or omissions falling under the discretionary function of a federal agency or employee. § 2674.
164. 932 F.2d at 795.
165. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k).
166. 932 F.2d at 792-94.
167. Id. at 792.
168. Id at 794-95. See J. Clark Kelso, Review of the Supreme Court's 1990-91 Term and
Preview of the 1991-92 Term for the Transnational Practitioner, 3 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 393 (1990)
(predicting that, in light of Aramco, the Supreme Court would hold that the Endangered Species Act
of 1973 was not intended by Congress to apply extraterritorially); Bradley J. Epstein, Note, The
Endangered Species Act Applies Extraterritorially. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d (8th Cir.
1990). (U.S. Supreme Court Oral Arguments Reprinted in Appendix A.), 5 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 447
(1992) (analyzing this issue in detail and predicting the same result).
169. 772 F. Supp. 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (mem.).
170. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370. This act sets forth the national environmental policy, and, in
keeping with the professed goals, requires federal agencies to submit environmental impact statements
with any legislative recommendation or project affecting the quality of the environment. §§ 4321,
4331-4332.
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Foundation in Antarctica. "' The district court also relied on the
Aramco analysis, finding that absent express intent to the contrary
by Congress, U.S. legislation was presumed to apply only within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.172 The district
court acknowledged that, although broad jurisdictional language is
found in NEPA, Congress neglected to provide a clear expression
of extraterritorial application. 73 In the absence of such an
expression, the court was not required to examine the legislative
history in order to determine congressional intent. 74
In light of these recent rulings by U.S. district courts, the fears
of the Aramco dissent appear to be materializing: courts, in
interpreting Aramco, are looking for an explicit statement of
congressional intent to apply a statute extraterritorially. 75 The
Aramco solution, requiring express congressional intent, sidesteps
the debate about the proper use of legislative history in statutory
interpretation.1 76 The end result is that courts now may freely rely
on this canon of interpretation and avoid looking at legislative
history for congressional intent. This restrictive approach to
statutory interpretation strengthens the presumption against
extraterritoriality and potentially may result in undermining
congressional intent for statutes drafted prior to the Aramco
decision.177
However, there is a limit to requiring express language, as
noted in United States v. Felix-Gutierrez.178 In Felix-Gutierrez,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that since Aramco
did not address the application of criminal law outside the U.S., the
rule of United States v. Bowman 171 was still valid law in this
171. 772 F. Supp at 1298.
172. Id at 1297.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. 111 U.S. at 1246 (Marshall, ., dissenting).
176. See The Supreme Court 1990 Term: Leading Cases, 105 HARV. L REV. 177, 370-79
(discussing Aramco).
177. Id.
178. 940 F.2d 1200 (9th Cit. 1991).
179. 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
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area."' °  The Bowman rule allows judicial inference of
congressional intent to provide extraterritorial jurisdiction for
crimes not dependent on the specific location of the crime, "but
are enacted because of the right of the Government to defend itself
against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated . . . . "1 In
Felix-Gutierrez, the U.S. prosecuted the defendant for his assistance
in the murders of Alfredo Zavala and DEA agent Enrique
Camarena-Salazar.'" The court stressed that these murders were
acts directly against the U.S. and that this characterization does not
change by moving the crime out of U.S. territory."' Therefore,
the court held that extraterritorial application of U.S. criminal law
is not hindered by Aramco."'
C. The Civil Rights Act of 1991185
Following the Court's decision in Aramco, Congressman
William Jefferson introduced House Bill 1694.86 The Bill was
designed to reverse the Supreme Court's holding in Aramco by
expressly extending the definition of employee under Title VII to
include Americans working abroad.18 7 The Civil Rights Act of
1991, which was signed into law by President Bush on November
21, 1991, incorporated House Bill 1694."8 In addition to
180. 940 F.2d at 1204.
181. 260 U.S. at 98.
182. 940 F.2d at 1203.
183. Id. at 1204.
184. Id. at 1205.
185. Pub. L No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
186. The American Employers Equity Act, H.1L 1694, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
187. H.R. 1694, § 2 (refining the definition of employee by adding "with respect to
employment in a foreign country, such term includes an individual who is a citizen of the United
States....").
188. See Statement of President George Bush upon the Signing of S. 1745,27 WEExLY COMP.
PREs. ,Doc. 1701 (Nov. 25, 1991). This new legislation, in addition to extending Title VII to
employees working abroad, also reversed or modified several other rulings by the Supreme Court,
which restricted litigation for employment discrimination. § 3, 105 Stat. at 1071. The new law, most
notably, makes available both compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional
discrimination based on sex, religion, or disability. § 3. It also overturns Wards Cove Packing v.
Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), to return the burden of proof to employers in justifying hiring and
advancement practices that may unintentionally discriminate against women and minorities in the
workplace. § 3.
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expanding the definition of employee under Title VII,'89 the Act
contains an exception clause similar to that stated in the
ADEA,1  which exempts Title VII compliance abroad if-by
adherence-the company would violate the law of a foreign
country. 
191
Thus, although the new civil rights law affords Title VII
protection for American workers abroad, the Act also raises legal
questions. The Act states that it does not apply retroactively to
conduct occurring before its enactment." z If this section of the
Act is read literally, it appears that the law is purely prospective
and would have no impact on thousands of currently pending
cases. 193 In December 1991, a federal judge adopted this reading
of the law and denied an employee's request to amend his pending
discrimination suit to take advantage of the new civil rights
law.'94 The EEOC also adopted this reading of the law. In a
policy statement released on December 30, 1991, the EEOC stated
that the amendment neither applies to pending cases nor does it
embrace potential future claims alleging discrimination prior to
November 21, 1991.195 Given the great number of pending cases,
it is likely that these rulings will be challenged and eventually
189. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).
190. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0.
191. § 109(b)(1), 105 Stat. at 1077 (amending 42 U.S.C. 2000e-1). "It shall not be unlawful
... for an employer... to take action otherwise prohibited ... with respect to an employee in a
workplace in a foreign country if compliance with such section would cause such employer ... to
violate the law of the foreign country in which the workplace is located." § 109(b)(1). See generally
Debra I. W. Cohn, Note, Equal Employment Opportunity for Americans Abroad, 62 N.Y.U.L. REv.
1288 (1987) (advocating the universal application of Title VII to American employers abroad and
denying employers immunity based on conflicts of law).
192. § 109(c), 105 Stat. at 1078. However, the general provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 state that, unless otherwise specifically provided, the amendments take effect upon enactment.
§ 402, 105 Stat. at 1099.
193. Robert Pear, Agency Prohibits Use of New Law in Old Bias Cases, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 31,
1991, at Al.
194. '91 Civil Rights Act is Ruled Irrelevant in F.B.L Bias Case, N.Y. ToM, Dec. 20, 1991,
at Al.
195. CutoffDate Set for CivilRights Claims, Cm. TRIB., Dec. 31, 1991, § Chicagoland, at 9
(crediting N.Y. Times News Services).
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appealed to the Supreme Court. '96 In the meantime, the prevailing
practice is to apply the law only prospectively.
Additionally, under the new civil rights law, an employer
accused of a Title VII violation may try to defend under the
conflicts of law exception by arguing that compliance with Title
VII causes the company to break a foreign law.197 However,
Congress did not provide the courts with guidelines for interpreting
"the law of the foreign country," and the matter has not yet been
litigated in the courts. Consequently, it is unclear whether this
exception will only apply to codified law or whether it will also
encompass the customs of the foreign country.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has made clear by its decision in Aramco
that, absent an explicit expression of congressional intent, an
American employee's Title VII protections could not be enforced
by the employee beyond the U.S. borders.198 In light of the recent
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, these protections are
reinstated to the extent that enforcement does not conflict with
foreign law.199 However, since the law is not retroactive, those
employees with pending or future claims, in which the
discrimination occurred prior to November 21, 1991, must look to
other areas of the law for protection against discrimination in the
workplace.0 0
The Court's analysis in Aramco implies that, absent an explicit
intent by Congress, as evidenced in the language of any statute,
future challenges to a statute's extraterritorial application will be
resolved by limiting the statute's application only to domestic
196. If the Supreme Court follows the reasoning in Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital,
488 U.S. 204 (1988), it is likely to hold that the Act is not retroactive. See id. at 216. In Bowen, the
Court declared that application of laws retroactively is not favored in the law absent explicit
congressional intent. In light of the ambiguity in the enactment provisions, finding this express intent
is unlikely. Id.
197. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1, amended by Pub. L No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1077).
198. 111 S. Ct. at 1227.
199. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
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situations. Although the courts continue to state that this canon of
construction is a rebuttable presumption, the recent decisions
limiting the scope of the FTCA and NEPA, to application solely
within U.S. borders, indicate that this presumption is not easily
negated." ' The requirement for overcoming this presumption is
not clearly defined, except that congressional intent must be clearer
than that which a court could deduce from the language of the
statute by negative inference.
In the future, a plaintiff trying to convince a court to apply a
statute extraterritorially, absent express language, could try to
demonstrate a sufficient governmental interest. If the plaintiff
demonstrates a sufficient governmental interest, a court might
analyze the statute under the weaker presumption of
extraterritoriality, allowing legislative history to be taken into
account. The past decisions by the courts applying the penal code
and the trademark laws extraterritorially indicate that, if the alleged
violation is directed against the U.S. and would have an adverse
effect on important U.S. policy goals if left unremedied, the courts
are more likely to find express congressional intent for
extraterritorial application. 2 Such policies forwarded in these
cases include the prevention of drug trafficking and the protection
of businesses from unfair trade practices. Administrative guidelines
and positions may be used to reinforce a plaintiff's contention that
a particular statute should be interpreted by the court to apply
abroad. However, the Court is likely to grant deference to an
agency's position only if it is well reasoned, stated
445
201. See supra part IV.B (discussing recent decisions)
202. See supra notes 52-62, 178-84 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which U.S.
legislation was applied abroad).
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contemporaneously with the questioned statute, and-most
importantly-has remained consistent over time.2 3
Jacqueline E. Bailey
203. See supra text accompanying note 135 (discussing Aramco's reaffimance of the Gilbert
test); see also Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981) (noting that under the principles in Gilbert,
an administrative agency's position, voiced contemporaneously with legislation, is afforded great
deference, while a change in this position over time is given considerably less deference); S.E.
Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412 (1979) (agreeing with Wan's approach to the
Gilbert test).
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